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the “4Ea” (extended, embedded, embod-
ied, enactive, and affective), in contrast to 
the “traditional” way of understanding the 
problem of cognition or GoFai (“Good 
old fashioned artificial intelligence”). 
The main difference between these two 
approaches would be a way to understand 
the mind-body problem and in particular 
the relationship between the nervous sys-
tem and consciousness. in general terms, 
while GoFai adheres to the idea of  a pre-
existing world that is independent from 
the observer and understands cognition 
as the computation of symbols that repre-
sent the outside world, the 4Ea approach 
rejects this view and argues instead for the 
co-dependency and co-determinations of 
subject-object.
« 8 » This conceptual shift certainly 
seems fundamental. if at one point we be-
lieved that we could find the solution of all 
human mysteries in our genes, today we 
seek “the truth” in our brains; the explo-
sion of disciplines such as “neuroeconom-
ics,” “neuroart” and “neuromanagment” 
somehow represent the hope of finding a 
solution to social and cultural issues in our 
neurons. There is much confusion in how 
we understand the relationship between the 
nervous system and consciousness. Perhaps 
the biggest problem is not in doing research 
that focuses only on studying neural activity 
without integrating subjective experience, 
which is therefore “reductionist,” but in the 
interpretation of the results thus obtained. 
The problem is the reductionist interpreta-
tion, and solving that it is necessarily a con-
ceptual change.
« 9 » The second step is to translate this 
conceptual transformation into a change, 
not only in the way of understanding, but 
also in how to experience our relationship 
with nature and with our mental life. The 
author argues that despite the reception and 
development that the vision represented by 
4Ea has had, this has not necessarily been 
“embodied” by its supporters.
« 10 » This step seems central to me: 
conceptualizing differently the body-mind 
problem is not the same as actually living it 
differently. Without this change of attitude, 
we risk defending an approach superficially, 
by fashion, without understanding what its 
transformative character is. This can make 
us operate from the same reductionist and 
dualistic paradigm as before, but this time, 
for instance, putting electrodes on the 
monks’ heads when we try to understand 
their skills in exploring their mental experi-
ence.
« 11 » While this article fully complies 
with its main objective, which is to provide 
a general idea of what it means to take se-
riously the integration of phenomenology 
into cognitive science, it concludes with a 
proposal that, in my view, has already 
been made. in essence, the invitation given 
by the author does not differ much from 
what varela proposed 20 years ago (varela 
1996a): a conceptual change from represen-
tationalism to the enactive approach, and 
a pragmatic attitude that develops tools to 
incorporate the study of experience to the 
scientific field. Hence, we may ask: (a) why 
did varela’s original proposal lead to adap-
tations, interpretations or readings in which 
phenomenology is subjugated to the criteria 
of validity of the natural sciences? (b) How 
can we, in fact, implement this paradigm 
shift?
« 12 » regarding the first question, i 
think that an interesting exercise that could 
shed light on finding a response would be to 
conduct an analysis of the historical roots 
that explain the need for control, certainty 
and objectivity that characterizes the cur-
rent way of doing science.
« 13 » regarding the second question, i 
think one hint might be to embody research 
about experience through the analysis of 
practices that facilitate direct contact with 
the experience. These practices might well 
be meditation and the phenomenological 
reduction, but not only these. For instance, 
improvisation skills in music (nachmano-
vitch 1990), dance (ravn 2010) or drawing 
(Eslava 2014) are practices that can teach 
us, through direct contact with our expe-
rience, about our cognitive processes and 
consciousness. one could identify through 
tools such as the elicitation interview (Pe-
titmengin 2006) the peculiar and common 
features of practices that promote openness 
and flexibility and encourage this attitude in 
different contexts.
« 14 » since varela made  his proposal, 
his heirs have been responsible for paving 
the theoretical way of the phenomenological 
approach to be considered in the scientific 
field. Perhaps, this is a turning point, where 
instead of trying to adapt the phenomeno-
logical approach to the naturalistic para-
digm, we should take another step and ex-
pand the limits of the naturalistic paradigm. 
The target article is a great contribution in 
this direction.
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> upshot • Vörös proposes that we phe-
nomenologise nature and, whilst I agree 
with the spirit and direction of his pro-
posal, the 4EA framework, on which he 
bases his project, is too conservative and 
is, therefore, unsatisfactory. I present 
an alternative framework, an enkinaes-
thetic field, and suggest further ways in 
which we might explore a non-dichot-
omised “betwixt” and begin to experi-
ence our world in a non-individuating, 
non-dual aspect.
« 1 » There are many things to like about 
sebastjan vörös’s target article, not least of 
which is the clarity of style and presenta-
tion of some very subtle and complex ideas; 
but more than this, it is the way in which 
the article stretches imaginatively over a 
broad range of interdisciplinary material 
and provides a really very good account of 
the recent revival of phenomenological ap-
proaches in cognitive science. The ultimate 
aim of his article is to demonstrate that, if 
we are to have a thoroughgoing grasp of 
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conscious experience, the current emphasis 
on naturalising phenomenology must be 
complemented by a systematic attempt to 
phenomenologise nature and the naturalis-
tic framework.
« 2 » vörös concludes with an appeal to 
the ways in which we might access the “be-
twixt between subject and object,” ways that 
would prompt us
“ not only to theorise differently about nature, 
mind, and consciousness, but also to live and 
experience them differently. The phenomenolo-
gisation of nature therefore entails not only the 
reconceptualisation of the notion of nature, but 
also, if not primarily, the radical transformation 
of being and our experiential relation to nature” 
(§37)
and, it follows, our relation to how we at-
tend to these reconceptualisations. He 
claims further that in doing this we will 
have taken a very large
“ step towards pacifying the epistemic fury of 
Uroboros (the vicious circle of the hard problem of 
consciousness) and transforming it into the epis-
temic felicity of ensō (the virtuous circle of lived 
experience and natural sciences), a hand-drawn 
circle in Zen calligraphy, representing harmony 
and enlightenment.” (§41)
« 3 » an air of optimism breathes 
through the paper and i find myself agree-
ing with a great deal, but not with every-
thing. so there are a number of things i 
would like to address; these include:
1 | the assumption that 4Ea (embodied, 
embedded, enactive, extended, and af-
fective) is a satisfactory model on which 
to base his project,
2 | the continued predominance of in-
dividuating theories, which lead to a 
skewed set of practical implications,
3 | the disappointment of the old chestnut 
of meditation as our means of access to 
the “betwixt,” and
4 | the uroboros metaphor.
« 4 » so, to the first concern: the 4Ea 
assumption that sits at the heart of the 
work. The advantages of adopting the 4Ea 
framework for thinking about conscious-
ness are many, but one of the foremost 
is that it is a model, conceived gradually 
over a number of years and from a range of 
perspectives, developed in response to the 
limitations of first-order cybernetics and 
to the classical – disembodied, represen-
tational, and symbolic or connectionist – 
information-processing model of cognition 
at the core of GoFai. as such, it puts the 
agent back into its experience as a perceiv-
ing, sensing, feeling living body, embedded 
in a world brought forth through its activity, 
and where that activity is facilitated by the 
agent’s ability to exploit objects in its envi-
ronment as a means of extending its cogni-
tive processes. additionally, 4Ea begins to 
address some of the issues raised by second-
order cybernetics about the observing sys-
tem as different in kind from the observed 
system of first-order dynamics. Finally, its 
development as a theory has been moti-
vated by the phenomenological tradition, 
both descriptive and existential, and phe-
nomenological theory works well with the 
concerns of second-order cybernetics.
« 5 » These are all good reasons to 
adopt a 4Ea framework and, despite Pe-
ter Hacker’s widespread disgruntlement 
(Hacker 2010), it is a framework that has 
provided a way in which we might better 
understand the mind and experience. and 
yet i wish to take issue with vörös’s use of 
4Ea as a satisfactory starting point from 
which he can develop his intriguing and 
provocative proposal, not only to access the 
non-dual betwixt, but also to bring the ex-
perience of the non-dual attitude into our 
everyday life (§36).
« 6 » one of the central limitations of 
4Ea is that it continues to individuate, and 
although the mind extends its cognitive ac-
tions and requirements, the individual qua 
individual still remains within its particular 
body or “skin-bag” (Clark 2008: xxviii). But 
we are not isolated individuals. We act in our 
worlds, as conscious, socially and culturally 
embedded, phenomenal agents, rich in our 
unique experiential histories, but also rich 
in our greatly distributed, complex array 
of felt affective relations and interrelations 
with other agents, entities and things. We 
routinely transgress our own bodily bound-
aries, spilling over into the bodily experi-
ence of others and in this way maintaining 
the primordial community and reciprocity 
of felt co-engagement. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1962: vii) presents this as the “always 
“already there” before reflection begins”; it 
is an always already there that is not as in-
dividuated beings, but as beings that dwell 
within the perpetual felt community and 
reciprocity of an enkinaesthetic field, where 
“field” is used to refer to the region in which 
a particular condition prevails; in this case, 
“field” refers to the topologically complex, 
affectively-laden dialogical field of our be-
ing-with our world.
« 7 » in stuart (2010, 2012, 2013), i 
have described our plenisentient – tactile, 
auditory, visual, gustatory, olfactory, kin-
aesthetic, nociceptive and proprioceptive – 
possibly naturally synaesthetic, affectively-
entangled living being-with our world as 
“enkinaesthesia.” it is an attempt to flesh out 
the always already there as “that primordial 
being which is not yet the subject-being nor 
the object-being” (Merleau-Ponty 1970: 
65). as primordial being, enkinaesthesia 
emphasises both the felt neuromuscular 
dynamics of the agent, the givenness and 
ownership of its experience (Henry 1973), 
and the entwined and situated co-affective 
immanence of the other and all others 
(agential – horse, caterpillar, mould, human 
beings, and non-agential – book, glasses, 
chair, coffee). This enkinaesthetic experi-
ence of other agents brings with it our antic-
ipated arc of their intentional action, which 
is to say that our enkinaesthetic experience 
appresents the affectively-rich lived (inten-
tional) experience of the other, and vice ver-
sa. or put another way, in our enaction, or 
bringing forth, of our world we are always 
simultaneously enacting, or bringing forth, 
the world of the other, and yet it is not re-
stricted to the other in some simple dyadic 
relationship; in bringing forth our world we 
are also anticipating (not necessarily cor-
rectly) the being and becoming of every-
thing within our experiential sphere. We 
are “always “already there” before reflection 
begins,” and it is unfortunate that through 
our customs and practices, through our 
language use in science, we have become 
accustomed to dividing and individuating 
through our dual attitude in everyday life.
« 8 » Through his systematic eidetic re-
duction, Edmund Husserl (1983) identifies 
consciousness of oneself and others as an 
essential structure of conscious experience; 
he speaks of our intentional transgression, 
of our having a pre-reflective, non-infer-
ential apperceptive analogizing experience 
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of the other (agential) as an animate being 
(Husserl 1982). Merleau-Ponty takes this up 
saying:
“ [a]t the same time the other who is to be per-
ceived is himself not a ‘psyche’ closed in on him-
self, but rather a conduct, a system of behavior 
that aims at the world, he offers himself to my mo-
tor intentions and to that ‘intentional transgres-
sion’ (Husserl) by which i animate and pervade 
him.” (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 118)
« 9 » Whilst Merleau-Ponty’s refers to 
the conduct and the system of behaviour of 
the other, he is also implying the felt neuro-
muscular dynamics of both agents in their 
enkinaesthetic experiential entanglement. 
Just as there is no principled distinction be-
tween mind, body, and environment for the 
coupled system in extended mind theory, i 
suggest that there is no principled distinc-
tion between affective agents. Through a 
“passive synthesis” (Husserl 2001) – a pre-
conceptual sense-making that is the mark 
of our practical bodily, kinaesthetic engage-
ment with our world – the other is given in 
our experience and we in theirs.
« 10 » so, whilst 4Ea claims to be radi-
cal in its embodiment, one might object that 
it is not radical enough. What is needed is a 
theory – i recommend enkinaesthesia – that 
recognises and supports the claim that sen-
sorimotor affective experience is extended, 
direct, and immediate. in our enkinaesthetic 
experiential entanglement, we are amidst a 
way of being with our world that is not self-
dwelling; nor is it other-dwelling, it is a way 
of being reciprocally folded into the being 
of things and other agents and organisms in 
my world. it is not an optional way of being, 
though it is one we frequently fail to grasp, 
possibly because we are in its midst, but 
possibly also because we are more usually 
equipped with reductionist strategies rather 
than ampliative and generative ones.
« 11 » now let us turn and look at an 
example of an alternative methodology 
through which we might inhabit the betwixt 
and begin to experience our world, that is, 
to “en-live,” in a non-individuating, non-
dual aspect.
« 12 » it is a little disappointing to see 
meditation come up again as our way to 
enlightenment in these sorts of contexts. i 
do not intend to be dismissive of medita-
tive practice or of its rich potential as a part 
of a strategy to understand conscious ex-
perience, but there are other methods that 
we might also investigate, especially in the 
context of our enkinaesthetic experiential 
entanglement. The one that comes most 
readily to mind is that of the non-manipu-
lative manual listening techniques in oste-
opathy.1 in this practice, the therapist uses 
their hands not to manipulate the patient’s 
body, but as the focal point of the listening 
process when attending to it; crucially, the 
osteopath’s hands do not need to touch the 
patient or even be in constant contact with 
the patient’s body.
« 13 » The defining characteristic of 
this listening process is that it derives first 
and foremost from the osteopath’s ability 
to sense the inner space in which organic 
life develops, one might even say that it is 
to sense this organic life itself, even though 
we are educated to believe that such a per-
ception is impossible because of the visual 
opacity of the appearance of the body.2
« 14 » They go on to say that as a result 
of our education, in which we treat others as 
bodies distinct from ourselves as subject, we 
think it is impossible for us to have a sensed 
access to and knowledge of the inner life of 
another living organism. Yet the process of 
osteopathic listening demonstrates that this 
is false. The osteopath must first develop a 
silence in her own psychic life, calming and 
quieting the continuous chatter and play of 
words and images; once a quiet is achieved, 
in this way they become receptive to the 
bodily experience of their patient. There is 
no physical manipulation, no searching with 
the hands for disharmony, just quiet, open-
ness, and listening, and when this resonance 
is achieved their experience is of a between, 
neither subject nor object.
« 15 » other methodologies would in-
clude, but are certainly not limited to, the 
enkinaesthetic resonance and attunement 
1 | see, for example, William sutherland at 
http://www.cranialacademy.com/cranial.html
2 | see also the presentation “The emergence 
of feeling in osteopathic manual listening” by Em-
manuel roche and Jean-Claude Gens at the con-
ference “investigating somatic consciousness: Be-
ginning with three methodologies,” sidney sussex 
College, university of Cambridge, 4–6 september 
2014.
that can develop between pupil and teacher 
in the practice of the alexander technique 
(stuart 2013) or between horse and rider in 
natural horsemanship or in the practice of 
dressage when an extraordinary affective ex-
tension can occur, even down to the hooves 
and tail end of the rider. in the context of 
natural horsemanship, the betwixt word 
“partnership” is used to refer to the sensitiv-
ity of mutual respectful listening and com-
munication between horse and human, and 
is characterised by the kind of openness and 
quiet we find in osteopathic listening.
« 16 » Finally, to the claim at the end, 
that the motivation of the article is to pacify 
the “epistemic fury of uroboros (the vicious 
circle of the hard problem of conscious-
ness).” Whilst i agree that cognitive science 
has been repeatedly stymied in its progress 
by encountering something that its, fre-
quently dualist, metaphysics compels it to 
simultaneously conclude yet fail to resolve 
– from Jack smart’s (1959) “nomological 
danglers” to david Chalmers’s (1995) “hard 
problem” and beyond – the uroboros meta-
phor, a metaphor of rebirth, renewal, and re-
emergence, is not representative of a vicious 
circle. if anything, it is vörös’s own work that 
fits this metaphor, presenting for the reader 
the enlightenment of a re-beginning, with a 
freshly-conceived model for understanding 
nature and consciousness.
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